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I
INTRODUCTION
The Soviet pipeline incident' in 1982 emphasized the conflicting
international views toward the exercise of jurisdiction over foreign
subsidiaries through parent companies. The validity of subsidiary jurisdiction
has become an important issue because of the increasing amount of economic
interaction and interdependence between states. The view of some states that
no form of extraterritorial subsidiary jurisdiction is acceptable fails to take
adequate account of a parent company's power to exercise control over its
subsidiaries. Contrastingly, the opposing view that subsidiaries are
jurisdictionally indistinguishable from their parents is too broad.
International law should provide a compromise that satisfies the major
concerns of states holding both views. Section 414[418] of the Restatement
(Revised) of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States2 provides such a
compromise because it authorizes only limited exercises of jurisdiction over
foreign subsidiaries.
This note examines the exercise of extraterritorial jurisdiction over foreign
subsidiaries through parent companies. Part II provides a brief summary of
the traditional bases for jurisdiction and examines current international
attitudes toward extraterritorial subsidiary jurisdiction. That section also
presents the Soviet pipeline incident as an example of an inappropriate
exercise of jurisdiction by the United States. Part III examines section
414[418] of the Restatement (Revised) which provides an excellent approach
to the problem of subsidiary jurisdiction. Section 414[418] provides a viable
model of international standards for the exercise of subsidiary jurisdiction
because it emphasizes the limited role that subsidiary jurisdiction should play.
Part IV offers a working solution to the problem of subsidiary jurisdiction.
Because of the current tensions surrounding extraterritorial subsidiary
jurisdiction, this note concludes that states should negotiate bilateral treaties.
Recognizing that treaties are a long-term solution which may take a
considerable period of time to finalize, this note proposes that notification
and consultation procedures be adopted during the interim period.
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1. See infra notes 19-47 and accompanying text.
2. RESTATEMENT (REVISED) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 414[4181
(Tent. Draft No. 6, 1985) [hereinafter RESTATEMENT (REVISED)].
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II
SUBSIDIARY JURISDICTION: PERSPECTIVES AND PROBLEMS
A. Jurisdictional Bases
There is no single basis for jurisdiction in international law that has
received universal acceptance. In general, states attempt to exert as much
jurisdiction as is feasible. Most states are convinced that they have the right to
control virtually everything within their borders, as well as activities that have
an effect within their borders. They also attempt to exert influence over the
activities of their nationals in other states. This section will provide a brief
summary of the recognized bases of extraterritorial jurisdiction. 3
The most traditional and widely accepted basis for jurisdiction is the
territorial principle. 4 Under the territorial principle, a state has jurisdiction to
prescribe laws pertaining to activities or failures to act within its territory.
5
Because there is now so much economic intercourse and interdependence
between states, it is questionable whether the territorial principle can
continue to serve as the primary jurisdictional basis in the subsidiary context.
Many corporations have established subsidiaries in foreign States. The
territorial principle does not respond adequately to conflicts of jurisdiction
arising from these arrangements because it fails to recognize that both the
home and host state may have legitimate reasons for exercising jurisdiction.
There are many instances in which a strictly territorial analysis is too inflexible
and therefore does not provide a satisfactory solution.
The "effects" doctrine, a derivative of the territorial principle, is
sometimes employed by states. 6 This doctrine authorizes a state to exercise
jurisdiction over individuals and activities occurring outside the state's
territorial limits because of illegal or unacceptable consequences within the
state.7 The "effects" doctrine arises primarily in antitrust cases. For example,
the United States has used this doctrine in antitrust cases to impose liability
on individuals or companies whose actions outside the United States produce
anti-competitive effects within the United States.8 In addition, the German
antitrust statute explicitly applies to all restraints of competition which have
an effect within the territorial scope of the statute-even when the restraints
3. See, e.g., Marcuss & Richard, Extraterritorial Jurisdiction in United States Trade Law: The Need for a
Consistent Theory, 20 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 439, 440-47 (1981); Feinberg, Economic Coercion and
Economic Sanctions: The Expansion of United States Extraterritorial Jurisdiction, 30 AM. U.L. REV. 323, 326-
33 (1981).
4. See Thompson, United States Jurisdiction Over Foreign Subsidiaries: Corporate and International Law
Aspects, 15 L. & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 319, 363 (1983).
5. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 17 (1965).
6. The "effects" test for jurisdiction was first articulated in United States v. Aluminum Co. of
Am., 148 F.2d 416, 443 (2nd Cir. 1945) (the Alcoa case).
7. See, e.g., id; Continental Ore Co. v. Union Carbide and Carbon Corp., 370 U.S. 690, 704
(1962); In re Uranium Antitrust Litig., 617 F.2d 1248, 1253-54 (7th Cir. 1980); Rivard v. United
States, 375 F.2d 882, 886 (5th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 884 (1967); Zenith Radio Corp. v.
Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., 494 F. Supp. 1161, 1177 (E.D. Pa. 1980).
8. United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945).
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occur outside the statute's territorial scope.9 Thus, the "effects" doctrine
brings individuals or companies within the territorial power of the state by
focusing on the location of the effects of their conduct. The location of the
company or the activities in question is irrelevant for jurisdictional purposes
under this doctrine. "This is the most controversial of the territorial-related
exercises of jurisdiction; it has provoked great debate when applied in
antitrust cases and has not been widely accepted by other states."' 0
The nationality principle authorizes a state to exercise jurisdiction over its
own nationals regardless of whether they are inside or outside of the state's
territory. Attempts to exert jurisdiction over foreign subsidiaries under this
principle depend on the nationality of either the parent or the subsidiary.'
U.S. law generally views corporations as nationals of the state of
incorporation. Some European countries also look to the principal place of
business or the center of activities.' 2
The security or protective principle allows a state to prosecute aliens
whose actions outside the territorial limits of the state threaten or harm the
security or independence of the state.' 3 The passive personality principle is
similar to the security principle in that it grants jurisdiction over aliens who
commit extraterritorial acts against the state's nationals. 14 Finally, the
universality principle authorizes states to punish aliens for crimes, such as
piracy, which violate "international public policy." 5
B. The Soviet Pipeline Incident
The United States has acted more aggressively than other states with
regard to jurisdiction over foreign subsidiaries. Claims of jurisdiction over
foreign subsidiaries by the United States do not fit directly under any of the
bases for jurisdiction set forth above.' 6 The United States has consistently
treated foreign subsidiaries as though they were branches of domestic
corporations. It has frequently ignored the separate legal status of foreign
subsidiaries and has attempted to exert jurisdiction over them based on
control or share ownership by U.S. parent companies. Unilateral
jurisdictional extensions by the United States have had significant
9. Many European countries are vehemently opposed to the "effects" doctrine, but others have
started incorporating it into their legal systems. See Gesetz gegen Wettbewerbsbeschrankungen,
1957 Bundesgesetzblatt [BGBI] I 1081 § 98(2) (July 27) (translation available in Gerber, The
Extraterritorial Application of the German Antitrust Laws, 77 AM. J. INT'L L. 756, 760 (1983)).
10. Thompson, supra note 4, at 363. See generally Nash, Contemporary Practice of the United States
Relating to International Law, 74 AM. J. INT'L L. 657 (1980).
I1. For a summary of the criteria used to determine the nationality of a corporation, see Note,
Extraterritorial Application of United States Law: The Case of Export Controls, 132 U. PA. L. REv. 355, 372-75
(1984).
12. See Thompson, supra note 4, at 364.
13. See Marcuss & Richard, supra note 3, at 445.
14. Id. at 447.
15. Id.
16. See Thompson, supra note 4, at 363.
Page 71: Summer 1987]
LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS
international repercussions' 7 and created many conflicts.' 8 The Soviet
pipeline incident is an example of one such jurisdictional extension
contributing to the international tension in this area.' 9
On June 22, 1982, the United States established an export embargo
prohibiting the re-export of oil and gas equipment (that utilized U.S. goods or
technology) to the Soviet Union from third countries. 20 These regulations
prohibited foreign subsidiaries of U.S. companies from selling oil and gas
equipment to the Soviet Union, and from selling these goods to any parties
who in turn sold them to the Soviet Union.2' The embargo was imposed to
cause economic injury to the Soviet Union in order to advance reconciliation
in Poland by discouraging Soviet interference there. 22 The United States
claimed jurisdiction over foreign subsidiaries because they were either owned
or controlled by persons or corporations subject to U.S. jurisdiction. 23
European governments reacted violently to this action because they felt the
United States had violated international law. 24 Although the controversy was
eventually mooted when President Reagan lifted the sanctions in November,
1982,25 the underlying tensions were not resolved.
The most serious tactical error committed by the U.S. was its failure to
include a grandfather clause in the regulations to prevent a retroactive effect
on existing contracts. Because of this error, both compliance and
noncompliance with the U.S. export regulations exposed foreign subsidiaries
to undesirable consequences. 2 6 Compliance with the regulations would have
caused subsidiaries to lose immediate income, to breach outstanding
contracts, and to risk the loss of future sales. Noncompliance, however,
would have caused the subsidiary to lose its U.S. export privileges and
licenses. This loss, in turn, would have hurt those subsidiaries that devoted a
large portion of their other business to the export of U.S. licensed products.
17. For discussion of the Soviet pipeline incident, see infra text accompanying notes 19-26. See
also Tittmann, Extraterritorial Application of U.S. Export Control Laws on Foreign Subsidiaries of U.S.
Corporations: An American Lawyer's View from Europe, 16 INT'L LAW. 730, 733-36 (1982); Zaucha, The
Soviet Pipeline Sanctions: The Extraterritorial Application of U.S. Export Controls, 15 L. & POL'Y INT'L Bus.
1169, 1173-78 (1983).
18. For an excellent discussion of historical examples of the application of U.S. laws to foreign
subsidiaries, see Thompson, supra note 4, at 322-61.
19. The procedural details of the incident have been catalogued by a number of commentators.
See, e.g., Merciai, The Euro-Siberian Gas Pipeline Dispute-A Compelling Case for the Adoption ofJurisdictional
Codes of Conduct, 8 MD.J. INT'L L. & TRADE 1, 10-13 (1984); Thompson, supra note 4, at 354-56.
20. 15 C.F.R. § 385.2(c) (1985).
21. The regulations also prohibited non-U.S. companies from selling U.S. oil and gas equipment
to the Soviet Union.
22. See infra text accompanying notes 63-67.
23. See Note, Dresser Industries: The Failure of Foreign Policy Trade Controls Under the Export
Administration Act, 8 MD. J. INT'L L. & TRADE 122, 127-29 (1984).
24. See generally European Communities: Comments on the U.S. Regulations Concerning Trade with the
U.S.S.R., reprinted in 21 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 891 (1982). See Common Market Challenges U.S. Policies
on Trade as Economic Relations Worsen, Wall St. J., July 1, 1982, at 4, col. 2; Canada May Challenge
Sanctions Set by U.S. on Soviet Pipeline, Wall St.J., Aug. 10, 1982, at 42, col. 1.
25. Revision of Export Controls Affecting the U.S.S.R. and Poland, 47 Fed. Reg. 51,858 (1982)
(codified at 15 C.F.R. §§ 379, 385, 390, 399 (1982)).
26. See Note, supra note 11, at 368.
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The solution seized upon by affected companies was to seek a judicial
resolution favorable to their position.
In clashes of extraterritorial jurisdiction, each state generally wins in its
own courts. 27 Dresser Industries, Inc. v. Baldridge28 and Compagnie Europeenne des
Petroles S.A. v. Sensor Nederland B. V 29 illustrate this point. The plaintiff in
Dresser Industries was a French subsidiary of a U.S. parent company. It sought
injunctive relief in a U.S. district court from an order issued by the Hearing
Commissioner of the International Trade Administration that had revoked all
of the outstanding U.S. export licenses of Dresser (France).30 This order was
issued after Dresser (France) violated the export restrictions by shipping three
natural gas compressors to the Soviet Union as required by contract.3 1 The
district court refused to grant injunctive relief from the temporary denial
order because Dresser (France) failed to satisfy the standard requirements for
an injunction.3 2 The court held that Dresser (France) had not made a strong
showing that it was likely to prevail on the merits, and the continuing
availability of administrative remedies eliminated the possibility of irreparable
harm. The court also stated that the regulations were "promulgated as part of
a major foreign policy exercise," suggesting that this action was one with
which courts should not interfere.33  The court's conclusion that the
regulations were primarily political was justified. As an American court, it
would have to follow the clear directives of the United States Government if
the regulations were intended to cover the type of transaction at issue and
were valid under the United States Constitution.3 4 As both of these
conditions were satisfied, the court could not engage in an independent
evaluation of the merits of the regulations.
Plaintiff C.E.P. in Sensor Nederland was a French company which had
contracted with Sensor Nederland B.A. for pipeline products destined for the
Soviet Union. Sensor was domiciled in the Netherlands and it was a one
hundred percent subsidiary of another Netherlands company, Geosource
27. Ultimately, the foreign state is more likely to prevail. Id. See also Vagts, The Global Coiporation
and International Law, 6J. INT'L L. & ECON. 247, 256 (1972). Professor Vagts points out that the
United States has repeatedly recognized that when its mandate encounters a contradictory
compulsion from a foreign state, its rule based on nationality or control must necessarily give way.
28. 549 F. Supp. 108 (D. D.C. 1982). For a discussion of this case, see Note, supra note 23.
29. Compagnie Europeenne Des Petroles v. Sensor Nederland, reprinted in 22 INT'L LEGAL
MATERIALS 66 (1983) (a District Court at the Hague Judgment, 1982).
30. The Commissioner's order was later modified to cover only the licenses of goods relating to
oil and gas technology. In re Dresser (France), Case No. 652, Order Modifying Temporary Denial of
Export Privileges, U.S. Department of Commerce, I.T.A. (Sept. 7, 1983), at 3.
31. See Oberdorfer, Equipment is Shipped to Soviets, Wash. Post, Aug. 27, 1982, at Al, col. 6.
32. Dresser Indus. v. Baldridge, 549 F. Supp. 108, 110 (D. D.C. 1982). The requirements for
injunctive relief were enunciated in Washington Metro. Area Transit Comm'n v. Holiday Tours, Inc.,
559 F.2d 841, 843 (D.C. Cir. 1977). The court held that it must inquire (I) whether the movant has
made a strong showing that it is likely to prevail on the merits of the case, (2) whether the movant has
shown that without such relief, it will be irreparably injured, (3) whether the issuance ofan injunction
would substantially harm other parties interested in the proceedings, and (4) where the public
interest lies. Id.
33. Dresser, 549 F. Supp. at 110.
34. United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 148 F.2d 416, 443 (2d Cir. 1945).
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International B.V.. Geosource International, in turn, was a one hundred
percent subsidiary of Geosource Inc., an American corporation. Sensor
informed C.E.P. that it would not complete delivery of the contract because,
as a subsidiary of an American corporation, it was bound by the export
embargo of June 22, 1982. C.E.P. brought suit in the District Court at The
Hague seeking specific performance of the contract or damages.3 5
The court considered various bases for American jurisdiction and
concluded that the Netherland courts did not have to recognize the American
embargo. 36 The court first stated that the contract between C.E.P. and Sensor
was governed by Netherlands law. It then found that Sensor had Netherlands
nationality both under international law and the March 27, 1956, Treaty of
Friendship, Commerce, and Navigation between the Netherlands and the
United States because Sensor was organized in the Netherlands and had its
center of administration there. 37 The court held that American jurisdiction
was not justified by the "nationality principle" because the United States had
attempted to bring within its scope foreign companies. It also rejected
American jurisdiction under the "protection principle," reasoning that the
protection principle applies to acts jeopardizing the security or
creditworthiness of the United States, and "doles] not include the foreign
policy interest that the U.S. measure [sought] to protect." 38 Finally, the court
dismissed the possibility of American jurisdiction under the "effects doctrine"
because the exportation covered by the embargo did not have direct and illicit
effects within the territory of the United States. The court therefore ordered
Sensor either to comply with the contract or to pay C.E.P. per diem damages
for each day after October 18, 1982, on which Sensor did not make delivery. 39
Both Dresser Industries and Sensor Nederland show normal judicial reactions to
extraterritorial extensions of jurisdiction. The results are not surprising
because each court owes a certain amount of allegiance to its own system.40 A
domestic court is not entirely free to evaluate independently the merits of
laws passed by the legislative body of its state. If the law is explicit, a domestic
court must apply it despite its own views on the substantive issues. In
decisions in which the law is less specific, such as those applying the Sherman
Act, a domestic court has greater freedom to construe these laws in a manner
35. 22 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 68 (1983).
36. Id. at 72-73.
37. Id. at 71. The conclusion that Sensor was a Netherlands company is consistent with the
conclusion reached by the United States Supreme Court when faced with a similar situation. In
Sumitomo Shoji Am., Inc. v. Avagliano, 457 U.S. 176 (1982), the Supreme Court held that the
protections of a treaty between Japan and the United States could not be used as a defense in a Title
VII suit brought against a wholly owned Japanese subsidiary. The Supreme Court held that the
treaty protections extended only to Japanese companies operating in the United States. A wholly
owned Japanese subsidiary that was incorporated in the United States was a U.S. corporation and
therefore subject to U.S. laws. Id. at 188.
38. 22 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 68, 72 (1983).
39. Id. at 74.
40. See Meessen, Antitrust Juimsdiction Under Customar
, 
International Lau), 78 AM.J. INT'L L. 783, 787
(1984). "[T]he courts on both sides of the Atlantic have no choice but to follow the directives of the
political branches of their respective states, however conflicting they might happen to be." Id.
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consistent with its own views of the legislative intent. Judge Learned Hand,
applying the Sherman Act in United States v. Aluminum Co. of America,4'
accurately summarized these ideas:
[T]he only question is whether Congress intended to impose the liability and whether
our own Constitution permitted it to do so: as a court of the United States we cannot
look beyond our own law. Nevertheless, it is quite true that we are not to read general
words, such as those in this [the Sherman] Act, without regard to the limitations
customarily observed by nations upon the exercise of their powers .... 42
The courts of a neutral state or the foreign State in which a subsidiary is
located will generally show hostility towards extraterritorial extensions. One
reason for this hostility is the prevailing view in international law that many
extraterritorial extensions are invalid.45  In addition, foreign courts,
particularly in neutral states, may not want to establish precedents which
approve and uphold extraterritorial extensions of jurisdiction because their
decisions may adversely affect the rights of their own state's nationals or
companies in future suits. Because of the bias against extraterritorial
legislation, states should fashion extraterritorial acts carefully to ensure
enforcement of these acts by foreign courts.
An analysis of the Soviet pipeline incident shows that the United States
failed to consider the possible consequences of exercising jurisdiction over
foreign subsidiaries. The United States should have sculptured its aggressive
extension of jurisdiction carefully, paying particular attention to the potential
conflicts that undoubtedly would arise. The incident substantially weakened
the position of the United States on extraterritorial jurisdiction over foreign
subsidiaries. 44  It also provoked universal criticism from European
governments and commentators. 45
The more serious problem, however, is the alienating effect that this
incident has had on U.S. relationships with its allies. "We cannot afford a
repetition of the pipeline fiasco, a fiasco that damaged the Western alliance far
more than it hurt the Russians." '46 Foreign States have responded to past U.S.
extraterritorial extensions with mechanisms designed to preserve their
jurisdiction. Blocking statutes are an example of one such mechanism. 47 The
Soviet pipeline incident has renewed interest in these options, and has
provoked a general feeling of hostility in international relations. The United
41. United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 148 F.2d 416, 443 (2d Cir. 1945).
42. Id.; see supra text accompanying notes 36-41.
43. Havers, Good Fences lade Good Neighbors: A Discussion of Problems Concerning the Exercise of
Jurisdiction, 17 INT'L LAW. 784, 788 (1983).
44. Furthermore, a government study concluded that most of the pipeline equipment could be
purchased from non-U.S. sources, and therefore even a successful embargo would have had only a de
minirnis effect on the Soviet Union. See Note, Dresser Industries, supra note 23, at 137.
45. See Havers, supra note 43, at 792-93.
46. See Havers, supra note 43, at 792. See also Tittmann, supra note 17, at 733-36.
47. Blocking statutes give a state the right to prohibit its nationals from furnishing commercial
information to a court or other authority in another state. For an excellent summary of blocking
laws, see Batista, Confronting Foreign "Blocking" Legislation: A Guide to Secutng Disclosurefroin Non-resident
Parties to American Litigation, 17 INT'L LAW. 61, 62-72 (1983). See also Rosen, The Protection of Trading
Interests Act, 15 INT'L LAw. 213, 224-28 (1981) (United Kingdom law).
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States has placed foreign States on the defensive and these foreign states now
feel they must aggressively protect their own interests. In short, a spirit of
self-protection, and not cooperation, dominates international relations.
III
THE APPROACH OF THE AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE IN THE
RESTATEMENT (REVISED)
Section 414[418] of the Restatement (Revised) contains provisions
relating to the exercise of extraterritorial jurisdiction on the basis of
intercorporate affiliation. It reads:
§ 414[418]. Jurisdiction with Respect to Activities of Foreign Branches and
Subsidiaries
(1) Subject to §§ 403 and 436, a state may exercise limited jurisdiction with
respect to activities of foreign branches of corporations organized under its laws.
(2) A state may not ordinarily exercise jurisdiction with respect to activities of
corporations organized under the laws of a foreign state on the basis that they are
owned or controlled by nationals of the state exercising jurisdiction. However, subject
to §§ 403 and 436, it may not be unreasonable for a state to exercise limited
jurisdiction with respect to activities of foreign entities
(a) by direction to the parent corporation in respect of such matters as
uniform accounting, disclosure to investors, or preparation of consolidated tax
returns of multinational enterprises; or
(b) by direction to the parent or the subsidiary in other exceptional cases,
depending on all relevant factors, including:
(i) whether the regulation is essential to implementation of a program to
further a major, urgent national interest of the state exercising jurisdiction;
(ii) whether the national program of which the regulation is a part
cannot be carried out effectively unless it is applied also to foreign
subsidiaries;
(iii) whether the regulation is in potential or actual conflict with the law
or policy of the state where the subsidiary is established; and
(c) in the exceptional cases referred to in paragraph (b), the burden of
establishing reasonableness is heavier when the direction is issued to the foreign
subsidiary than when issued to the parent corporation. 4 8
Section 414[418] applies only to jurisdiction exercised on the basis of
intercorporate affiliation, and does not affect the exercise of jurisdiction on
other bases. 49 The provisions of sections 403 and 436 are applicable to
exercises ofjurisdiction over branches or subsidiaries. Section 403 spells out
the criteria for evaluating reasonableness. 5 ) Section 436 contains specific
provisions relating to conflicting directives issued to nationals living abroad
by the home and the host state. 5' This note will assume that the requirements
of sections 403 and 436 have been satisfied and will proceed to examine the
additional requirements in section 414[418].
The key to interpreting section 4141418] is contained in the limiting
language within the individual subsections. If these limitations are not
48. RESTATEMENT (REVISED) smpra note 2, § 414[418].
49. Id. comment a, at 230-32.
50. Id. § 403.
51. Id. § 436[419].
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followed strictly, it is likely that the resulting extensions of U.S. jurisdiction
will lead to another international fiasco like the Soviet pipeline incident.
Subsection (1) authorizes a state to exercise limited jurisdiction over the
activities of foreign branches of corporations organized under its law. 52
Although the home state must respect the jurisdiction of the foreign State,
international law recognizes that the exercise ofjurisdiction by the home state
is appropriate in some situations. This subsection shows proper deference to
this international principle by specifying that the home state may exercise
only "limited" jurisdiction. Faithful adherence to this principle should
substantially reduce disagreement. For example, most foreign States would
accept the prescription of U.S. antipollution standards on the production of
automobiles by foreign branches of U.S. automotive manufacturers for sale in
the foreign State. They would most likely defer to this exercise ofjurisdiction
provided that by so doing no significantly harmful internal effects result.
It is impossible to state the boundaries of "limited jurisdiction," but these
boundaries can be determined on a case-by-case basis. As an illustration,
suppose a U.S. based corporation creates a new drug that shows considerable
promise for treating certain illnesses, but also has significant side effects.
After testing the drug, the United States determines that it is too dangerous
and therefore unsafe for use. The United States then forbids production and
distribution within the United States. It also prohibits the corporation's
foreign branches from producing or selling the drug abroad. This
hypothetical approaches the boundaries of "limited jurisdiction" because
many foreign states have their own standards and agencies for testing new
drugs, and may be opposed to the imposition of U.S. safety standards on
companies acting within their territories. Despite their conflicting beliefs
concerning the safety of the underlying drug, however, most states probably
would not object to this exercise of jurisdiction over foreign branches. One
reason why states would not object is that foreign branches are viewed as
closely analogous to foreign nationals, and under the nationality principle a
state may exercise jurisdiction over its nationals outside of its territory. A
foreign branch could also be ordered (by its controlling body) to leave the
objecting state. Another reason is that the prohibition would be directed only
to the foreign branch, and would not interfere with the ability of other
companies to distribute the drug.
The first sentence of subsection (2) accurately restates current
international law concerning jurisdiction over foreign subsidiaries: A state
may not ordinarily exercise jurisdiction over subsidiaries incorporated in a
foreign State on the basis of control or ownership by nationals of the state
exercising jurisdiction. 53 The main reason for this view is that incorporation
is a voluntary choice that confers specific benefits on the shareholders.
Foreign incorporation results in the subsidiary being treated as a national of
the foreign State. Such treatment protects shareholders of the parent
52. Id. § 414[418](1) (emphasis added).
53. Id. § 414[418](2).
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company from financial liability and shields them from orders of the foreign
State. It also entitles the subsidiary to the protection of local laws. In
exchange for treating the subsidiary as its own national, the foreign State is
justified in expecting the home state to relinquish its primary jurisdiction.
The home state, however, often will not want to relinquish its primary
jurisdiction, preferring to retain as much control as possible. If given a
choice, most home states would prefer (although they cannot compel) a
parent company to set up a foreign branch instead of a subsidiary, enabling
the home state to treat that entity as its own national. In addition, although a
subsidiary may operate as a distinct unit, in most cases it is not a completely
independent entity. Parental control frequently dictates the course of action
the subsidiary must follow. By exercising control, the parent may be able to
accomplish objectives that are illegal under the laws of the parent's state. For
example, it is illegal for Delaware corporations to operate gambling casinos in
Delaware. 54 A Delaware corporation, however, could set up a subsidiary in
the Bahamas to conduct gambling there. 55 This would enable the subsidiary
to conduct a casino business even though gambling is illegal under the laws of
the parent company's state of incorporation. Therefore, some limited
exercises of jurisdiction by the home state are desirable.
Section (2)(b) is the most controversial; no international consensus about
this type of jurisdiction exists. It provides that exercising limited jurisdiction
over foreign subsidiaries is not "unreasonable." 56 Paragraph (b) provides a
nonexclusive list of factors a state should consider before exercising
jurisdiction. Courts should also use these factors to evaluate the
reasonableness of the state's action. 57 This section, however, also emphasizes
the need for limitations on home state jurisdiction by stating that it should be
exercised only in "exceptional cases."' 58
Additional limitations on home state jurisdiction are contained in each of
the factors listed in paragraph (b). Subparagraph (i) states that a home state
may issue a regulation only if that regulation is an essential element in the
furtherance of a major, urgent national interest. 59 Thus, except in rare
circumstances, a state should not assert jurisdiction over subsidiaries as part
of the state's general foreign policy. Foreign subsidiaries are not foreign
branches, despite the fact that they are owned or controlled by the home
state's parent company. The drafters also stress this point in subparagraph
(ii), which directs the state to consider whether there are any alternative
means of effectively accomplishing the objectives of the state's national
54. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 1403 (1979).
55. Gambling houses may be set up in the Bahamas with permission of the Governor. See STAT.
L. OF THE BAHAMA ISLANDS ch. 48, § 257(1) (1965).
56. The section states that "it may not be unreasonable for a state to exercise limited
jurisdiction." RESTATEMENT (REVISED), supra note 2, § 414[418](2)(b).
57. Id. § 414[418](2)(b).
58. Id. (emphasis added).
59. Id. § 414[418](2)(b)(i).
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plan.6°11 However, this subparagraph may be superfluous because a state is not
likely to risk an international controversy if it could accomplish the same
objectives without exercising jurisdiction. Nevertheless, this factor does force
the state to consider other options. It also emphasizes the exceptional
circumstances required to justify the exercise of jurisdiction.
Finally, subparagraph (iii) directs attention to whether exercising
jurisdiction would conflict with the laws or policies of the state where the
subsidiary is established. 6' Directing the state to consider other states'
policies is significant; the potential for conflict with other states' policies is
substantially greater than the potential for conflict with laws only. Good faith
adherence to the requirements of this subparagraph places significant
limitations on the exercise of subsidiary jurisdiction because it prohibits a
state from exercising jurisdiction where such exercise would cause the
subsidiary to take actions contrary to established policies of the foreign State.
The comments to this subparagraph only direct the state to consider the
"clearly expressed policy of the [foreign] state."-62 Because this section is
designed to avoid conflict between states, however, the spirit of section
414[418], suggests that a state should also consider the unexpressed policies
of the foreign States.
The actions of the United States in the Soviet pipeline incident failed to
satisfy the requirements of section 414[418]. The attempted extension of
jurisdiction over the subsidiaries of U.S. parent companies was not an
"exceptional case." There was nothing unique about the situation. The trade
embargo was an ordinary foreign policy action. In fact, a foreign state might
respond to such an action by issuing similar directives to its own nationals.
The attempt by the United States to inhibit completion of the Soviet pipeline
through the trade embargo was a symbolic response designed to express the
displeasure of the United States with Soviet actions in Poland. 63 When the
embargo was extended on June 22, 1982, President Reagan stated that the
"objective of the United States in imposing the sanctions has been and
continues to be to advance reconciliation in Poland. Since December 30,
1981, little has changed concerning the situation in Poland; there has been no
movement that would enable us to undertake positive, reciprocal
measures." 64 Symbolic political actions do not qualify as exceptional cases in
which it would be appropriate to exercise jurisdiction because they frequently
have extended and uncertain effects. It is highly unlikely that the United
States believed the Soviets would decrease their influence in Poland even if
foreign subsidiaries fully cooperated.
Moreover, the trade embargo was imposed because of the economic
implications that the pipeline had for the Soviet Union and the political
60. Id. § 414[418](2)(b)(ii).
61. Id. § 414[418](2)(b)(iii).
62. Id. comment d.
63. See Note, Dresser Industries, supra note 23, at 135, 139-41.
64. President's Statement on Extension of U.S. Sanctions, 18 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. 820
(June 18, 1982).
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implications it had for Western Europe. The Soviet Union is unable to
produce enough food to feed its population, and is incapable of exporting a
sufficient amount of manufactured goods to buy the necessary food,
technology, and other goods. Because of this trade imbalance, the Soviet
Union has problems generating enough foreign currency to sustain its import
purchases.65 Nevertheless, the Soviet Union has over forty percent of the
known world gas reserves. 66 These considerations led to the imposition of
the embargo. As one commentator noted:
The Reagan Administration .. .[saw the Soviet-European pipeline as] an agreement
which will provide the Soviet Union with substantial hard currency earnings that will
help ease the burden of expanded military spending, or at least ease the rate at which
that burden is growing. There is also a general concern that a Europe dependent on
the USSR for 5 percent of its total energy supplies will be a Europe ever so slightly
more willing to see the Soviet side in the great-power rivalry. In addition, the Reagan
administration is bothered by the symbolism involved in the conclusion of a significant
agreement between the Soviet Union and Europe when in the space of four years the
Soviets invaded one country and crushed a grass-roots mass political movement in
another.
6 7
This explanation for the embargo does not present sufficient justification
for the exercise of subsidiary jurisdiction; it does not transform the actions of
the United States into the type of "exceptional case" contemplated by section
4141418](2). The United States for many years attempted to retard the Soviet
military buildup and prevent enhanced Soviet-European relationships.
Furthermore, the Soviet Union had been negotiating agreements concerning
the pipeline with Europe for a number of years.
One major shortcoming of section 414[418] is that it fails to explain what
situations qualify as "exceptional." It seems clear that direct U.S.
involvement in a war or the imminent threat of such involvement would satisfy
the exceptionality requirement. Short of these two occurrences, however, it is
questionable whether any other circumstances would suffice. Although the
drafters wanted to emphasize that jurisdiction over foreign subsidiaries is an
extraordinary action, their failure to define "exceptional circumstances"
makes the section difficult to apply.
An evaluation of the Soviet pipeline incident under the relevant factors
listed in paragraph (2)(b) shows that the actions of the United States were
unreasonable. The trade embargo was not implemented to further a "major,
urgent national interest."'68  If the reasons given by the United States are
taken at face value, the national interests of Poland and not those of the
United States were at stake as a result of Soviet activity. Section 414[418]
makes no allowance for the use of subsidiary jurisdiction to promote the
national interests of other states. This section's authorization of subsidiary
jurisdiction as a means of furthering the national interest of the state
exercising jurisdiction is controversial enough; embracing the national
65. Hewett, The Pipeline Connection: Issues for the Alliance, BROOKINGS REV., Fall 1982, at 15, 19.
66. Id. at 15.
67. Id. at 19-20.
68. RESTATEMENT (REvISED), supra note 2, § 414[418](2)(b)(i).
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interests of other states would only heighten the controversy. Furthermore,
there were no urgent U.S. national interests at stake. Poland, the pipeline,
and the Soviet military buildup were relatively long-standing situations with
no immediate resolution in sight. Because the exercise of jurisdiction by the
United States was not "essential," its actions as analyzed under subparagraph
(i) were not reasonable.
Subparagraph (ii) focuses attention on whether the exercise ofjurisdiction
over the subsidiary is necessary for effective completion of the national
program. 69 Evaluation of this factor is somewhat difficult because of the
uncertainty concerning the purpose of the embargo. However, because the
purpose of the plan was to "advance reconciliation" in Poland, 70 and to
impair completion of the pipeline, subsidiary compliance was necessary for an
effective embargo.
Finally, subparagraph (iii) requires an evaluation of whether the regulation
sought to be applied is in potential or actual conflict with the law or policy of
the foreign States. 7' Europe refused to join in an embargo previously
proposed by the United States against the Soviets because of Soviet activity in
Poland. 72 This refusal provides strong evidence that subsidiary compliance
with the embargo would directly conflict with the policies of other states.
Furthermore, the active involvement of European governments in the
promotion and completion of the pipeline reflected Europe's position: it
wanted both the gas from the pipeline and the income from the pipeline-
related exports to the Soviet Union. The attempted interference by the
United States with completion of the pipeline through the embargo was
therefore in actual conflict with the policies of the states in which subsidiaries
were established.
Subparagraph (iii) mandates a consideration of both the actual and the
potential conflicts that may arise as a result of exercising jurisdiction over a
foreign subsidiary. Although the embargo did not conflict with any current
foreign laws, the United States should have known that foreign States might
pass laws compelling subsidiaries to violate the embargo orders and complete
delivery contracts with the Soviets. The European states' earlier refusal to
participate in an embargo and their support for the pipeline shows that
subsidiary compliance would cause conflicts. The existence of these conflicts
makes the actions of the United States unreasonable under subparagraph (iii).
Thus, analysis of the pipeline incident under section 414[418] shows that
the United States acted unreasonably. The surrounding situation was not an
"exceptional case" justifying the exercise of extraterritorial subsidiary
jurisdiction, and the actions of the United States failed to satisfy the
requirements of two out of three subparagraphs in section 414[418](2)(b). As
a result, the United States should not have exercised jurisdiction.
69. See supra note 60.
70. See supra President Reagan's statement in the text accompanying note 64.
71. See supra note 61.
72. See Note, Extrateritorial Application, supra note 11, at 364.
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This conclusion is consistent with part II's conclusion that the United
States was not justified in exercising jurisdiction over foreign subsidiaries.
That both analyses produce the same result supports the argument that
section 414[418] is a viable basis for analyzing the exercise of jurisdiction by
the United States over foreign subsidiaries. While section 4141418] provides
a compelling analysis where the exercise ofjurisdiction is inappropriate, to be
complete section 414[418] must reach the same result where the exercise of
jurisdiction is appropriate. Unfortunately, there has not been an
internationally accepted exercise of subsidiary jurisdiction to test whether
analysis under that section would also produce a consistent result.
In summary, an analysis of section 414[418] shows that it provides a fairly
narrow basis for exercising subsidiary jurisdiction. Any exercise of
jurisdiction over foreign subsidiaries is controversial, and the section contains
significant limitations on a state's right to exercise that jurisdiction. Strict
adherence to the limiting language contained in the section will reduce the
potential for controversy and promote acceptance of subsidiary jurisdiction by
foreign states and international tribunals. In fact, a strict adherence to the
language of section 414[418] may even produce results that are more
restrictive of conduct than is desirable. Given the tense international
situation, however, it may prove wiser to impose greater limitations than
necessary on the exercise of jurisdiction.
IV
RECEPTIVENESS OF EUROPEAN COUNTRIES TO SUBSIDIARY
JURISDICTION AND THE LONG-TERM TREATY SOLUTION
Europeans have criticized the extensions of U.S. jurisdiction over foreign
subsidiaries, 73 but it is clear that the predominant European view, based
primarily on the territorial principle, is too narrow. The desire to focus on
strictly territorial considerations and to adhere rigidly to the idea of complete
corporate separateness fails to provide a viable solution to the
extraterritoriality problem. The world has become so interconnected and
interdependent that primary reliance on the territorial principle is unrealistic.
Foreign subsidiaries have played a significant role in establishing these
international connections, and international agreement on proper jurisdiction
over these subsidiaries is needed to promote stability. Unfortunately, largely
as a result of the Soviet pipeline incident, it is no longer possible to obtain a
general international consensus. Feelings of hostility and the quest for self-
protection have replaced the spirit of cooperation. The uncertainty
surrounding future exercises of extraterritorial subsidiary jurisdiction has also
created great uneasiness among Europeans.74 In addition, there are inherent
73. See Havers, supra note 43, at 786.
74. Id.
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shortcomings in relying on national judiciaries to establish the basic
principles. 75
Although individual European countries have voiced opposition to
extraterritorial jurisdiction over subsidiaries, 76 their collective action in their
own multistate interactions shows an implicit acceptance of the idea that
wholly owned or controlled subsidiaries are not completely independent
entities. The Commission of the European Communities and the Court of
Justice of the European Community have developed an approach to multi-
state interactions known as the "economic unit" theory. 77 The economic unit
theory ignores the separate legal status of parent and subsidiary corporations
and treats the two as one united entity for purposes of establishing
jurisdiction. The net result of the establishment of jurisdiction is the strong
potential for the imposition of liability.
The economic unity theory was first applied by the Court of Justice of the
European Community in Imperial Chemical Industries, Ltd. v. E.C. Commission.78
In that case, the Commission challenged a price increase instituted by eighty
percent of the Community dyestuff producers. Imperial Chemical Industries,
Ltd. (ICI) argued that the court had no jurisdiction over the applicants
because the applicants' registered offices 79 were outside the Common Market.
The court dismissed this argument and held that it had jurisdiction because
ICI was within the Common Market. The court offered the following
explanation:
The fact that a subsidiary has a distinct legal personality does not suffice to dispose of
the possibility that its behavior might be imputed to the parent company ... with
which it then forms one economic unit .... In these circumstances, the formal
separation between these companies ... cannot, for the purposes of application of the
competition rules, prevail against the unity of their behavior on the market. 80
In reaching its decision to exercise jurisdiction, the court stressed ICI's
control over the subsidiary. The court noted that ICI held the whole or a
majority of the capital of these subsidiaries. However, additional language in
the opinion suggested that control alone might not be sufficient to impute the
subsidiary's conduct to its parent. Rather, the opinion suggested that
75. See, e.g., A. HERMANN, CONFLICTS OF NATIONAL LAWS WITH INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS
ACTIVITY: ISSUES OF EXTRATERRITORIALITY 4-5 (1982). Laker Airways Ltd. v. Sabena, 731 F.2d 909
(D.C. Cir. 1984) (Judge Wilkey focused on the directives of the United States government and would
not perform an independent balancing of the international issues).
76. See supra notes 24, 45.
77. The Commission and the Court have used this theory in cases brought under Articles 85 and
86 of the Treaty of Rome which contain the competition (antitrust) laws for the European Economic
Community (EEC). See Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community, entered m force Jan.
1, 1958, art. 85, 298 U.N.T.S. 11; Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community, entered in
force Mar. 25, 1957, art. 86, 295 U.N.T.S. 2. For an excellent discussion of the economic unit theory,
see B. BARACK, THE APPLICATION OF THE COMPETITION RULES (ANTITRUST LAW) OF THE EUROPEAN
ECONOMIC COMMUNITY TO ENTERPRISES AND ARRANGEMENTS EXTERNAL TO THE COMMON MARKET 53-
73 (1982).
78. Imperial Chem. Indus. v. E.C. Comm'n, I1 COMMON MKT. L. REP. 557 (1972) (the
"Dyestuffs case").
79. This is equivalent to the place of incorporation.
80. Imperial Chem. Indus. v. E.C. Comm'n, 11 COMMON MKT. L. REP. 557, 629 (1972).
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imputation of the conduct of the subsidiary to the parent was appropriate
when the subsidiary "does not determine its behavior on the market in an
autonomous manner but essentially carries out the instructions given to it by
the parent company." 8' After dismissing ICI's jurisdictional argument, the
court proceeded to affirm the Commission's finding that ICI had violated EEC
competition laws and the Commission's consequent imposition of liability.
The subsequent cases have focused more on the percentage of capital
owned and less on the extent to which control is exercised.8 2 In fact, in later
decisions in which the Court ofJustice of the European Community exercised
jurisdiction, the parent company owned a smaller percentage of capital than
that owned by ICI. s 3 Moreover, both the court and the Commission have
been willing to imply actual control in cases in which the parent company
owned a majority of the stock or capital, reasoning that majority ownership
gives the parent the power to control.8 4 The court has never exercised
jurisdiction, however, in cases in which the parent owned less than a majority
of the subsidiary's capital. 85
In many cases, the use of a percentage-ownership test as the sole criterion
for proof of control will produce the same conclusion (with respect to the
existence of control) as the court would have reached had it considered the
presence or absence of other indicia of control. Nevertheless, focusing solely
on percentage ownership is undesirable because it eliminates the possibility of
treating a truly independent subsidiary differently. One could argue that the
power to exercise control and actually exercising it are two different things. It
is difficult to quantify parental control, but the parent and subsidiary should
have the option of proving that the parent did not exercise control despite the
fact that it owned a majority of the capital. A counter argument is that, as a
practical matter, majority ownership gives the parent the power to control.
Whether this power is actually exercised should not be determinative of the
existence of jurisdiction. Nevertheless, it is particularly useful to allow a
company to demonstrate absence of control in situations where the parent
had no advance knowledge of the subsidiary's activities, and would not have
authorized these activities if it knew about them. This scenario is quite
possible where a parent's subsidiary is managed and operated solely by
individuals within a foreign state. Unfortunately, no EEC decisions provide a
81. Id.
82. See infra text accompanying notes 86-92.
83. See infra note 91 and accompanying text (fifty-one percent ownership was sufficient).
84. See infra text accompanying notes 86-92.
85. There are two explanations for the court's emphasis on both capital ownership and the
exercise of control by the parent company. First, the court may have stressed the need for both to
provide additional justification for the new and somewhat radical economic unit theory. As it has
grown more comfortable with the theory, it may feel that both elements are no longer necessary.
Second, it may have wanted to leave open the option of using the economic unit theory in situations
where a parent exercised control but did not own a majority of the subsidiary's capital or stock.
Unfortunately, subsequent cases have not provided an answer to the question of whether control
alone (and no majority ownership) would suffice.
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clear answer as to whether majority ownership would be sufficient if the
company could show that the parent had no control over the subsidiary.
In Europemballage Corp. and Continental Can Company, Inc. v. E. C.
Commission,86 the Court of Justice of the European Community used the
parent-subsidiary relationship to establish jurisdiction over the American
parent, Continental Can Company. The court, using language similar to that
in Imperial Chemical, stressed the lack of autonomous market behavior. It also
stressed that Europemballage Corp. followed instructions from the parent to
make an offer to buy the shares of a company in the Netherlands and that the
parent provided the necessary funds. 87 The court made it clear that the "fact
that Continental Can does not have a seat in the territory of one of the
member states does not suffice to remove it from the jurisdiction of
community law." 8
The Court of Justice of the European Community also used the economic
unit theory in Instituto Chemioterapico Italiano SpA and Commercial Solvents Corp. v.
E.C. Commission."9 The court summarily approved the Commission's finding
that at least with respect to the plaintiff Zoja, Commercial Solvents Corp.
(Commercial) and its subsidiary Instituto Chemioterapico Italiano SpA
(Instituto) acted as one economic unit.90 The Commission's decision,
however, shows that fewer indicia of control were required in this case than in
previous cases to support the conclusion that the two were a single economic
unit.
The Commercial Solvents Corp. holds controlling power over Istituto Chemioterapico
since it holds 51 percent of its share capital, which permits it to exercise permanently a
determining action over the formation of the corporate will and thus over the
management of Istituto Chemioterapico, given that the general meeting, by the
favourable vote of a number of shareholders representing more than the majority of
the share capital, has inter alia the power to appoint the directors, to discuss their
responsibilities to approve the balance sheet.... It may then be concluded that the
Commercial Solvents Corp. holds the power of control over Istituto Chemioterapico
and exercises it in fact, at least as regards its relations with Zoja. 9 1
Therefore, that Commercial's fifty-one percent ownership gave it the power to
exercise control was sufficient to establish jurisdiction over the subsidiary, and
consequently liability was imposed. Jurisdiction did not depend on Instituto's
failure to exhibit any "autonomous market activity." 92 It was sufficient that
the two corporations apparently acted as a single economic unit in dealing
with Zoja. The court's subsequent failure to scrutinize these findings with
respect to control shows tacit consent to the Commission's approach, and
86. Europemnballage Corp. v. E.C. Comm'n, 12 COMMON MKT. L. REP. 199 (1973).
87. Id. at 221.
88. Id. at 222.
89. Instituto Chemioterapico italiano SpA v. E.C. Comm'n, 13 COMMON MKT. L. REP. 309
(1974). For an in-depth discussion of this case, see Bentil, Control of the Abuse of llonopolv Power in EEC
Business Law, 12 COMMON MKT. L. REP. 59 (1975).
90. Instituto Chemioterapico Italiano SpA v. E.C. Comm'n, 13 Comm. Mkt. L. R. 309, 342-44
(1974).
91. Laboratorio Chimico Farmaceutico Giorgio Zoja SpA v. Commercial Solvents Corp., 12
COMMON MKT. L. REP. D50, D56-57 (1973).
92. See supra text accompanying notes 80-81.
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indicates that mere power to exercise control, as opposed to actual control,
will suffice to establish jurisdiction.
In these cases, the Court of Justice of the European Community exercised
jurisdiction over the controlling parent because the subsidiary had engaged in
illegal activities within the court's jurisdiction. This situation differs from
obtaining jurisdiction through a controlling parent over a subsidiary in a
foreign jurisdiction. Although the two situations are not identical, the key
element in both cases is the parent's ability to control its subsidiary. In the
EEC opinions, the establishment ofjurisdiction and subsequent imposition of
liability in two of the three was implicitly based on one or both of these
theories: (1) The parent directly exercised its control over the subsidiary and
ordered it to commit the illegal acts; or (2) the parent failed to exercise its
control to prevent the subsidiary from violating the law. Under both theories,
the ability to control the subsidiary was the basis for both the exercise of
jurisdiction and the imposition of liability. The claim of the United States to
jurisdiction over foreign subsidiaries is based on the same criterion. In fact,
the court's position is even more extreme because it uses control both as a
means to exercise jurisdiction and to impose financial liability. This
imposition of financial liability is far-reaching because the court pierced the
corporate veil even though the entities were separately incorporated. The
court's justification for finding liability was the parent's ability to control the
subsidiary. These EEC cases show that Europeans have recognized that it is
necessary to exercise intracorporate jurisdiction in some multistate
interactions.
The courts, however, are ill-suited to formulate acceptable international
standards for extraterritorial subsidiary jurisdiction.93 One plausible solution
is for the United States to negotiate treaties with European countries.
Treaties may also promote greater cooperation from foreign States in the
application and enforcement of extraterritorial legislation. Although one
multilateral treaty would be ideal, it is more realistic to expect negotiation of
bilateral treaties. Moreover, bilateral treaties would be advantageous because
they would enable both states to tailor the treaty to satisfy their particular
concerns. The provisions of section 4141418] would provide a good starting
point for negotiations. It is particularly important that these negotiations
determine the extent of ownership or control that states would agree to
recognize as sufficient for the exercise of jurisdiction. One drawback to the
treaty solution is that negotiation is a slow and time consuming procedure.
Nevertheless, the treaty option is the most feasible one in light of the pressing
need for such agreements and the absence of a general international
consensus concerning the proper scope of extraterritorial subsidiary
jurisdiction.
The United States should therefore begin negotiations with the European
countries concerning the exercise of jurisdiction over foreign subsidiaries.
93. See supra text accompanying notes 74-75.
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There are already precedents for this in the antitrust area where the United
States has signed agreements with the Federal Republic of Germany and
Australia.94 The United States State Department and heads of foreign States
may at first resist these treaties because they prefer the flexibility of handling
each situation as it arises, but the need for greater certainty in multinational
economic transactions and the need for cooperation from foreign States
outweigh the benefits of ad hoc treatment. The United States may also resist
the treaty mechanism on the ground that it has no incentive to enter into
treaties limiting its ability to exercise extraterritorial jurisdiction. The United
States lacks such an incentive because it has always been primarily a capital
exporter. As a result of its trade position, the United States has traditionally
been the state extending jurisdiction rather than the object of an
extraterritorial extension of jurisdiction by another state. This argument,
however, only considers the current trade position of the United States. As
the U.S. economy becomes more internationalized, the position of the United
States will change. Before long, the United States may find itself affected by
extraterritorial extensions of jurisdiction. Thus, although treaties may
immediately limit the United States, the greater certainty and stability these
treaties will provide will be of value in the future.
Section 4141418] of the Restatement (Revised) would provide a viable
model for international negotiations. It presents an approach that satisfies
the conflicting needs of providing the home state with limited jurisdiction
over foreign subsidiaries and protecting the foreign State's jurisdictional
powers. Section 414[418] achieves this result by authorizing only limited
exercises of subsidiary jurisdiction in exceptional cases. 95 A good faith effort
by two states to strictly adhere to the limiting language contained in section
414[418] would produce a workable compromise. That both states would
have reciprocal rights under the treaty also helps assure that neither would
abuse its jurisdictional power.
V
THE INTERIM SOLUTION: NOTIFICATION AND CONSULTATION
Negotiating treaties as a means of establishing guidelines for subsidiary
jurisdiction requires considerable time and energy. There is a strong need for
an interim solution that would bridge this gap. The Organization for
Economic Co-operation and Development's (OECD's) notification and
consultation procedures9 6 provide an excellent model which states could
easily adapt to the subsidiary jurisdiction context.
94. See Agreement Between the Government of the United States of America and the
Government of Australia Relating to Cooperation on Antitrust Matters, 21 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS
702 (1982) (signed June 29, 1982); Federal Republic of Germany-United States: Agreement
Relating to Mutual Cooperation Regarding Restrictive Business Practices, 15 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS
1282 (1976) (entered into force Sept. 11, 1976).
95. See supra text accompanying notes 90-91.
96. See ORGANISATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT, THE 1984 REVIEW OF
THE 1976 DECLARATION AND DECISIONS 25-27 (1984) which provides:
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Although the OECD's procedures focus on extensions of jurisdiction to
the activities of multinational enterprises abroad, the basic principles address
concerns relevant to subsidiary jurisdiction. The extending state must first
notify the affected state that it is contemplating an extraterritorial exercise of
jurisdiction. 97 This procedure is ideal because it allows the extending state to
receive feedback and to evaluate the concerns of the affected state before it
has committed itself to a particular course of action. It also enables the
extending state to incorporate any suggestions for alternative solutions. The
drafters of the procedures recognized, however, that advance notification will
not always be feasible. The language therefore states that notification should
occur "as soon as practicable. '" 98 The use of the word "practicable" instead
of one like "possible" acknowledges that a state may have security or other
compelling reasons for not providing the earliest possible notification in all
(a) General Considerations
27. In contemplating new legislation, action under existing legislation or other exercise of
jurisdiction which may conflict with the legal requirements or established policies of another
Member country and lead to conflicting requirements being imposed on multinational
enterprises, the Member countries concerned should:
i) Have regard to relevant principles of international law;
ii) Endeavour to avoid or minimise such conflicts and the problems to which they give
rise by following an approach of moderation and restraint, respecting and accommodating
the interests of other Member countries (21);
iii) Take fully into account the sovereignty and legitimate economic, law enforcement
and other interests of other Member countries;
iv) Bear in mind the importance of permitting the observance of contractual
obligations and the possible adverse impact of measures having a retroactive effect.
28. Member countries should endeavour to promote co-operation as an alternative to
unilateral action to avoid or minimise conflicting requirements and problems arising therefrom.
Member countries should on request consult one another and endeavour to arrive at mutually
acceptable solutions to such problems.
(b) Practical Approaches
29. [omitted]
30. Member countries should therefore be prepared to:
i) Develop mutually beneficial, practical and appropriately safeguarded bilateral
arrangements, formal or informal, for notification to and consultation with other Member
countries;
ii) Give prompt and sympathetic consideration to requests for notification and bilateral
consultation on an ad hoc basis made by any Member country which considers that its
interests may be affected by any measure of the type referred to under paragraph 27 above,
taken by another Member country with which it does not have such bilateral arrangements;
iii) Inform the other concerned Member countries as soon as practicable of new
legislation or regulations proposed by their Governments for adoption which have
significant potential for conflict with the legal requirements or established policies of other
Member countries and for giving rise to conflicting requirements being imposed on
multinational enterprises;
iv) Give prompt and sympathetic consideration to requests by other Member countries
for consultation in the CIME or through other mutually acceptable arrangements. Such
consultations would be facilitated by notification at the earliest stage practicable;
v) Give prompt and full consideration to proposals which may be made by other
Member countries in any such consultations that would lessen or eliminate conflicts.
These procedures do not apply to those aspects of restrictive business practice or other matters
which are the subject of existing OECD arrangements.
97. Id. at 26 (paragraph 27).
98. Id. at 26-27 (paragraph 30(iii)).
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cases. Notification provisions therefore incorporate a realistic compromise
and recognize the competing policy considerations of each state.
The consultation provisions also promote interaction between the states
and emphasize the duty of the extending state to give prompt and full
consideration to proposals made by the affected state.9 9 One goal of the
procedures is to minimize conflicts between states.' 0 0 Establishing and
maintaining open communication between extending and affected states is
essential to achieving this goal. It is true that situations will arise that cannot
be resolved by negotiation, but consultation may reduce the negative impact
of unilateral action.
An example using the facts of the Soviet pipeline incident will show how
the United States could have employed notification and consultation
procedures. Prior to the issuance of regulations onJune 22, 1982, the United
States could have privately notified the governments of European states that it
was contemplating issuing regulations to prevent the re-export of gas and
pipeline equipment and technology to the Soviet Union. The United States
could then have given these states an opportunity to comment on the
regulations and propose alternatives or suggestions. For example, the
European states might have emphasized the importance of a grandfather
clause to prevent breaches of existing contracts. 0 1  It is likely that the
European states would have also expressed their strong opposition to the
regulations. Perhaps they would have made it clear that they would take
whatever action was necessary to prevent the success of the embargo. This
interaction might have led the United States to create a plan that the
European states would have supported. In addition, the United States would
have had more information with which to make a decision concerning the
regulations. This information might have led the United States to realize that
the embargo would not succeed, and that its implementation through the
regulations would only antagonize our allies. The United States could then
have decided whether it nonetheless wanted to issue the regulations, but it
probably would not have issued them. The advance notification,
consideration of European proposals, and the justifications offered by the
United States for its actions might have produced a more favorable response
by the European states. At a minimum, the European states would not have
been surprised by the regulations and could have taken steps to reduce losses.
Adopting notification and consultation procedures would also produce
other significant benefits. It would help reduce the international tensions that
have developed in response to recent extraterritorial exercises ofjurisdiction.
In particular, it would demonstrate a willingness on the part of extending
states to consider the rights of affected states. The good faith employment of
notification and consultation procedures would ameliorate feelings of hostility
and self-protection, and would help foster the development of greater
99. Id. at 27 (paragraph 30(v)).
100. Id. at 26 (paragraph 27(ii)).
101. See supra text accompanying note 26.
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cooperation among states. Cooperation is necessary for successful treaty
negotiations. Even when the affected state and the extending state are unable
to resolve their differences, advance notification would enable the affected
state to prepare for the consequences of the proposed action. 10 2 The United
States has already established a notification and consultation agreement
concerning antitrust matters with Canada, ' 0 3 and in 1985 adopted notification
and consultation requirements for the imposition of export controls by the
United States. 10 4 This latter action by the United States should receive warm
international praise and produce a commendable result. It should also act as
an initiative to other states to adopt similar provisions.
VI
CONCLUSION
The world has reached an impasse in the area of subsidiary jurisdiction.
The apparent view of the United States that all subsidiaries owned or
controlled by American nationals are functionally identical to United States
corporations is too broad. Because of the tension pervading this area, it
appears that an acceptable compromise will require the negotiation and
signing of a number of bilateral treaties. The process of negotiation alone
will help alleviate the perception of European states that the United States
believes it may exercise extraterritorial jurisdiction without recognizing
similar exercises by foreign states.
The provisions of section 4141418] of the Restatement (Revised) would
provide a good starting point for the treaty negotiations. The language of
section 414[418] emphasizes that states should exercise jurisdiction over
foreign subsidiaries only in limited and exceptional cases. This is consistent
with the current needs of international law. In many instances, states should
recognize that parents and their subsidiaries are separate entities. There are
an increasing number of cases, however, where this view ignores the realities
of parental power to control its subsidiary. The analysis suggested by section
414[418] properly considers both of these competing needs. The one major
flaw of the section is that it does not focus on the amount of control required
to justify the exercise of jurisdiction. The approach of the Court of Justice of
the European Community in Imperial Chemical Industries, Ltd. would provide a
good model for resolution of the control problem. In reaching its decision,
102. This will produce only a negligible benefit in situations where notification was given only
shortly before implementation.
103. Memorandum of Understanding Between the Government of the United States of America
and the Government of Canada as to Notification, Consultation and Cooperation with Respect to the
Application of National Antitrust Laws, 23 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 275 (1984) (signed Mar. 9, 1984).
104. Export Administration Amendments Act of 1985, Pub. L. No. 99-64, § 108(d), 99 Stat. 131
(to be codified at 50 U.S.C. § 2405 (Supp. III 1985)). The new section reads:
CONSULTATION WITH OTHER COUNTRIES.-When imposing export controls under this section,
the President shall, at the earliest appropriate opportunity, consult with the countries with which
the United States maintains export controls cooperatively, and with such other countries as the
President considers appropriate, with respect to the criteria set forth in subsection (b)(l) and
such other matters as the President considers appropriate.
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the court did not look solely at the percentage of stock ownership. Instead, it
also considered the amount of control actually exerted by the parent over the
subsidiary.' 0 5 This approach properly balances the parent's power to control
and the subsidiary's independent existence. An important part of the treaty
negotiations will be to establish standards or tests for determining control.
During the interim prior to completion of the treaty process, other states
should follow the United States' example of adopting notification and
consultation procedures. The purpose of these procedures is to provide
foreign States with as much advance notice of an extraterritorial extension of
jurisdiction as is practical. Ideally, notification would occur early enough to
allow feedback from the affected state. The extending state could then
incorporate any suggestions made or at least make its decisions with greater
knowledge of the potential ramifications. Notification and consultation
procedures should reduce international tensions because they evidence a
willingness on the part of the extending state to consider the potential
consequences of its actions within foreign States.
105. The court may have required greater indicia of control in this case because the parent-
subsidiary link was used as the basis for imputing direct financial liability. See supra note 78.
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